Week 10 · Lesson 11

Password Policies and Authentication Alternatives

A password is just one way to prove who you are, and the weakest one in the set. This lesson puts strong password policy next to its alternatives — SSH, certificates, MFA, biometrics — and then shows how AAA centralises authentication, authorisation, and accounting across every device. The exam asks both halves: what makes a strong credential, and how the AAA architecture (TACACS+ and RADIUS) manages it at scale.

CCNA 200-301 Domain 5.0 Security Fundamentals Verified 2026-10-11
Learning objectives
Part 1

A strong password policy

A password policy is the organisation’s contract about credentials. The modern guidance (echoing NIST SP 800-63B) has moved away from “change every 90 days” as the headline rule and toward the things that actually stop attackers:

Design rule Think of it as a funnel: the policy reduces the password to the weak first factor, then layers the second factor on top. The best passwords are long, unique, and protected by MFA — not complicated enough to force writing down.
In this lesson · select a part to jump

Key ideas & exam traps · select one

Part 2

Passwords on the device: encryption and enable secret

Lesson 4 covered the mechanics; here is the policy view. On a Cisco device, enable secret protects privileged EXEC mode with a one-way hash, while enable password stores cleartext or weak type-7 obfuscation. The rule: always use the secret; never the password. For every other stored password (console, VTY, local users), service password-encryption applies type-7 scrambling so the running config does not display readable secrets:

R1(config)# enable secret Str0ngSecret!
R1(config)# service password-encryption
R1(config)#
Type 7 is reversible service password-encryption does not truly encrypt — type 7 is a fixed, reversible obfuscation that any free tool can crack in seconds. Use it to deter shoulder-surfers, not as a security control. The hash inside enable secret is the real protection; newer IOS can use SHA-256 via enable algorithm-type sha256 secret instead of legacy MD5.
Part 3

Local user accounts: login local

Instead of giving every line its own password, IOS can keep a local database of usernames and passwords. The VTY and console lines then use login local to authenticate against that database, which gives each administrator a name for audit trails and lets individual accounts be revoked without changing a line password:

R1(config)# username admin privilege 15 secret Password!
R1(config)# username ops privilege 5 secret Ops-2026!
R1(config)# line vty 0 4
R1(config-line)# login local
R1(config-line)# transport input ssh

Each username carries a privilege level (0-15). Privilege 15 is full control; lower levels limit commands, which is a crude authorisation mechanism. Local accounts are fine for a handful of devices, but they do not scale — every router keeps its own copy of every credential, so hiring and firing means touching each device. That scaling problem is exactly what AAA (Section 8) solves.

Part 4

SSH vs Telnet

Both protocols open a remote command shell; the difference is the transport. Telnet sends every byte — including the password — in cleartext over TCP 23. Anyone sniffing the path (or any switch with a port mirror) can replay the session. SSH (Secure Shell) encrypts the entire session over TCP 22 and authenticates the server with a key pair first, so sniffing yields ciphertext and the password never travels in the clear.

PropertyTelnetSSH
PortTCP 23TCP 22
EncryptionNone — cleartextFull-session encryption
Server identityNot verifiedVerified via host key
Modern verdictDeprecated; disable with transport input sshRequired standard
Exam tip The VTY lines default to accepting Telnet. The single command that closes that door is transport input ssh on line vty 0 4 — allowing SSH only. Any question showing Telnet on a management line is asking for this fixation.
Part 5

Multi-factor authentication

MFA requires two or more independent factors before access succeeds. The three factor classes are: something you know (password, PIN), something you have (smartphone app, hardware token, smart card), and something you are (fingerprint, face). Two different factors — say a password plus a one-time code from an app — defeat the two most common attacks at once: if the password leaks, the attacker still lacks the token, and if the token is duplicated, they still lack the password.

Definition — factor A distinct category of credential. Knowledge, possession, and inherence are the three classic categories. Multi-factor means using different categories, not just two passwords — two pins are still one factor.

MFA is cheap now, and it is the difference between a password breach being a nuisance and a password breach being a disaster. For admin access to infrastructure (the CCNA/CyberOps audience sit right here), MFA is baseline practice, not a nice-to-have.

Part 6

Certificates

A digital certificate is a credential that binds an identity (a person, a device, a server) to a public key, signed by a trusted authority. Authentication with certificates works by proving possession of the matching private key during a challenge — the holder never sends the private key itself:

Certificates are ideal for device-to-device authentication because there is no shared secret to copy around each device holds its own key pair, and they scale with CA-managed issuance and revocation. On the exam, remember whose job the CA does (authoritative identity), and that the private key must never leave its device.

Part 7

Biometrics

Biometrics authenticate on something you are: fingerprint, iris, face, or voice. They are convenient and hard to share — you cannot forget your fingerprint the way you lose a password — but they are not magical:

Note On the network-exam level, biometrics is a concept and a policy option, not a config. The blueprint wants you to name the factor category (something you are), recognise its place in MFA, and think about its privacy and management costs.
Part 8

AAA: authentication, authorisation, accounting

AAA centralises access control in three distinct services:

ServiceJobAsks...
AuthenticationVerifies who the user is“Are you really admin?”
AuthorisationDecides what the user may do“Are you allowed to run configure terminal?”
AccountingLogs what the user did“What commands did you run, and when?”

With AAA, the device phones home to a central server on login. Authentication uses the server’s verdict; authorisation returns command- and service-level permissions; accounting ships start/stop records of sessions and commands to a log. The benefit over local accounts is governance: one database, one revocation path, and a complete audit trail. IOS activates it with aaa new-model, then configures the server and methods:

R1(config)# aaa new-model
R1(config)# aaa authentication login default group tacacs+ local
R1(config)# aaa authorization exec default group tacacs+
R1(config)# aaa accounting exec default start-stop group tacacs+
R1(config)# tacacs server TAC1
R1(config-server-tacacs)# address ipv4 192.168.1.50
R1(config-server-tacacs)# key TacacsKey123
R1(config-server-tacacs)# exit

The catch-all fallback phrase “group tacacs+ local” means: try TACACS+ first, and if the server is unreachable, fall back to local accounts — the safe default for keeping management access alive during an outage.

Part 9

TACACS+ vs RADIUS

Two server protocols dominate AAA, and the exam asks for their differences constantly:

PropertyTACACS+RADIUS
Transport & portTCP 49UDP 1812/1813
EncryptionEncrypts the whole packet bodyEncrypts only the password (rest of packet readable)
AuthorisationSeparate authorisation step, records per-command levelsMerges authorisation with authentication response (attributes)
AccountingSeparate, flexible accounting subsystemBuilt-in accounting (start/stop/update)
Typical homeCisco device managementNetwork access (wireless, VPN, wired 802.1X) and general services
Exam tip — the port numbers TACACS+ = TCP 49 (flagship for admin/AAA on Cisco devices; encrypts the entire packet). RADIUS = UDP 1812 (auth) and 1813 (accounting) (the de facto standard for 802.1X and wireless login; encrypts only the password. RADIUS shares the device NAT/network ports with many protocols, which is precisely why TACACS+ separated its transport.)

The question that decides which one a scenario wants: is this device administration or network access? Device administration (login to the router, per-command permissions) leans TACACS+. Network access (WPA2-Enterprise wireless, VPN users, 802.1X) leans RADIUS. Neither is exclusive, but the blueprint tests the association.

Router / switch management plane TACACS+/RADIUS Admin · MFA app authentication + authorisation accounting records
AAA moves the three questions to a central server: are you who you say you are (authentication), may you do this (authorisation), and which actions were logged (accounting).
Reference table · select a row

Key terms

The vocabulary you need

Every term below appears in the lesson text above. Select one to read its definition, then use the quiz at the end to check what stuck.

Key terms · select a term

Part 10 · Your turn

Review

Check what you have learned with these review questions.

Review · 5 questions

Sources

Sources & references

  1. Cisco. CCNA (200-301) Exam Topics. cisco.com.
  2. IETF. Request for Comments (RFCs). rfc-editor.org.
  3. IANA. Internet Assigned Numbers Authority registries. iana.org.

Target exams: CCNA 200-301 v1.1 · CyberOps Associate 200-201. Last content verification: 2026-10-11.